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Political connections and their function in corperate have been discussed a lot by 
scholars no matter home or abroad.  Corperates' connections with government exist 
in both developing and developed economies. Scholars are very interested in the 
effects of political connections in both types of enterprises. Recently, there are many 
works on the topic. 
Interactions between governments and firms could provide firms with not only 
easier entrance of regulated sectors, but also tax reduction, more access to bank loans 
and other advantages. In areas lack law protection of property rights, connections can 
also protect firms from expropriation by government. We are interested in the role of 
political connections when the government intervenes the market. 
Using a sample of Chinese listed real-estate companies, we test the relationship 
between firm value and the level of connections under different policy context. We 
define political connections as the directors on board with the work experience as 
government/military officials, or a current or former member of People's Congress/the 
People's Consultative Congress. And the level of connections is the proportion of such 
directors on the board. We find SOEs’ level of connection has significant relation with 
firm performance during the control period, but we do not find such relationship in 
non-state-owned companies. When the policy environment is easier, however, 
relationship between rate of political connection and firm value is insignificant in both 
types of firms. 
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业有正面影响（Ferguson 和 Voth，2008；Charumilind et al.，2006；Adhikari et al，
2006 [2-4]），但政治家与企业的联系损害企业利益的事实也得到了一些学者的支持















































































































（Khwaja和Mian，2005；Goldman et al.，2006；Bertrand et al.，2007；Guedhamiet 
al.，2011）[5, 9-11]。除此以外，企业与政治家及其家人之间的关系（Ramalho，2004；
Faccio，2006）[12, 13]、政府在企业中的股权（Mitchell和Joseph，2010）[14]以及企




Boubakri et al.（2008）[15, 16]都用董事会中具有政治背景的董事人数来衡量联系的
强弱程度。除此以外，企业赞助的选举费用数额或比例（Jayachandran和Seema，


























































和Oberholzer-Gee，2005；Khwaja和Mian，2006；Charumilind et al.，2006；Claessens 
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